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Abstract
This research is the rst to examine dynamic general equilibrium
in a growing two-country economy under decreasing marginal impa-
tience (DMI). The stability condition is shown to be more restrictive
than in the case of an endowment economy and/or under increasing
marginal impatience (IMI). By analyzing global-economy adjustment
to time preference shocks, international transfers, and productivity
shocks, equilibrium dynamics in the presence of DMI di¤er drastically
from what is obtained when the standard IMI model is used. For
example, in a country characterized by DMI, a positive productivity
shock improves the countrys welfare level and lowers its steady-state
time preference and, hence, the steady-state interest rate. This leads
to an increase in the neighboring countrys capital stock.
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1 Introduction
Although many theoretical studies on macroeconomic dynamics have been
conducted using endogenous time preferences (e.g., Epstein, 1987a, b; Lu-
cas and Stokey, 1984; Obstfeld, 1990; Ikeda, 2006), it has usually been as-
sumed that the degree of impatience measured by the pure rate of time
preference is marginally increasing in wealth, thereby ensuring stability.
When the degree of impatience is marginally decreasing in wealth, the wealth-
ier are more patient and, ceteris paribus, become even wealthier over time.
However, many existing empirical studies often support the validity of de-
creasing marginal impatience (DMI) (e.g., Lawrance, 1991; Samwick, 1998;
Harrison et al., 2002; Ikeda et al., 2006). To develop realistic macroeconomic
models, it is necessary to examine dynamic implications of DMI in general
equilibrium settings.
Using a two-country capital-accumulation model, the purpose of this pa-
per is to derive theoretical implications of DMI for dynamic stability, open
macroeconomic adjustments, and policy e¤ects. This is the rst attempt to
characterize solutions for a dynamic general equilibrium in a growing two-
country economy under DMI.
A seminal paper by Devereux and Shi (1991) examines a growing two-
country economy within the framework of endogenous time preferences. How-
ever, the analysis is limited to the case of increasing marginal impatience
(IMI). For example, using the IMI model, they show that a positive pro-
ductivity shock increases the steady-state interest rate slightly, and hence
decreases the neighboring countrys capital stock. However, under DMI, the
same productivity shock improves the countrys welfare level, thereby lower-
ing its steady-state time preference and hence the steady-state interest rate;
this increases the neighboring countrys capital stock. Similarly, we show that
in the presence of DMI, the growing two-country economy exhibits dynamic
properties that drastically di¤er from what is obtained in the usual but
empirically less relevant IMI setting.
In the literature on DMI, Das (2003) rst veries that DMI is compati-
ble with dynamic stability in a production economy with capital. Hirose and
Ikeda (2008) show solution properties under DMI, including optimal satiated
consumption. However, they do not discuss the general equilibrium implica-
tions of DMI under agent/country heterogeneity. Further, Hirose and Ikeda
(2012a, b) solve two-country equilibria under DMI. However, their analysis
is restricted to the endowment economy model without capital.
1
Supposing that one country has a DMI preference, for the steady-state
equilibrium to be saddle-point stable, it is necessary that the other country
displays IMI. Although the same property is valid in the case of an endow-
ment economy, the saddle-point stability condition is more restrictive in a
capital-accumulation economy than in an endowment economy.
Thus, to investigate the implications of DMI, we consider the case in
which one country exhibits DMI while the other country exhibits IMI, with
retaining the saddle-point stability of equilibrium dynamics. Then, an up-
ward shift of the subjective discount rate schedule in the IMI country lowers
the steady-state interest rate and, hence, increases the steady-state capital
stock and output in both counties. This paradoxical result cannot be ob-
tained in the case where both counties exhibit IMI, as in Devereux and Shi
(1991).
Considering the saddle-path dynamics after international transfers in a
capital-accumulation economy, the interest rate and capital stock sluggishly
deviate from their constant steady-state values initially and then return
to them. Moreover, although the convergence path of the IMI countrys
consumption is monotonic, that of the DMI countrys consumption is non-
monotonic. Such non-monotonic consumption adjustment after international
transfers never emerges if both counties exhibit IMI.
As the e¤ects of improvements in productivity, we obtain the following
results. First, the interest rate falls in the long run, although it rises in
the short run. Second, the steady-state capital stock and output increase in
both countries. Third, the steady-state consumption increases in the DMI
country, while it decreases in the IMI country. Fourth, an improvement in
the DMI countrys productivity typically increases its steady-state net foreign
assets, whereas an improvement in the IMI countrys productivity typically
decreases its steady-state net foreign assets. These results are rather di¤erent
from those obtained in Devereux and Shi (1991).
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following manner. In Sec-
tion 2, we construct a growing two-country economy model with endogenous
time preference, in which dynamic properties of the equilibrium solution are
discussed. In Section 3, we analyze global-economy adjustment to time pref-
erence shocks, international transfers, and productivity shocks. In Section 4,
we conclude the paper.
2
2 The model
Suppose that the world economy is composed of two countries 1 and 2, each of
which is populated with the same number of innitely-lived identical house-
holds. Without loss of generality, the population is assumed to be one. A
single type of goods, which can be either consumed or invested and is trade-
able across countries, is produced by competitive rms in both countries
using constant-returns-to-scale technologies with capital and labor. Equities
representing claims to the capital stock are traded in a perfect international
nancial market. Letting ai and ki (i = 1; 2) denote the asset holdings and
the capital stock in country i, respectively, country is net foreign assets bi
are expressed as
bi = ai   ki: (1)
In each country, one unit of labor is supplied inelastically by the representa-
tive household.
2.1 Households
The budget constraints for the representative households in country i (i =
1; 2) are given by
_ai = rai + wi   ci; (2)
where ci denote consumption, wi the labor wage, and r the interest rate; and
a dot represents the time derivative.
We specify the preferences by assuming variable time preferences as
max
Z 1
0
ui
 
ci (t)

exp( i (t))dt; (3)
where ui (ci) (i = 1; 2) represent the instantaneous utility functions; and i
denote cumulative discount rates with instantaneous discount rates i (ci):
i (t) =
R t
0
i (ci ())d , or
_i (t) = i
 
ci (t)

;i (0) = 0: (4)
For intertemporal preferences to be well-dened, we follow the literature
(e.g., Epstein, 1987a; Obstfeld 1990; Hirose and Ikeda, 2008) in assuming
that the following standard regularity conditions are valid: (C1) ui < 0
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(i = 1; 2); (C2) ui are strictly increasing and strictly concave in ci; (C3)  ui
are log-convex in ci; and (C4) i are concave in ci. It is known, and will be
shown later, that the degree of impatience, measured by the rate of time
preference, is marginally increasing or decreasing in wealth as the discount
rate i is increasing or decreasing in ci. Since the regularity conditions,
(C1)-(C4), are not related to the signs of the rst derivatives of i (hereafter
di=dci is expressed as ic, and so on), the degree of impatience can be either
marginally increasing or decreasing under the conditions.
Let i and i (i = 1; 2) represent the current-value shadow prices for
savings and the discount factor exp ( i), respectively, and the generating
functionsi are dened as
i
 
ci; i

= ui
 
ci
  ii  ci : (5)
Then, the optimal conditions to maximize lifetime utility function (3) are
given by
ic
 
ci; i

= i; (6)
_
i
=
 
i
 
ci
  ri; (7)
_
i
=  i  ci; i ; (8)
lim
t!1
exp
  i (t)i (t) ai (t) = 0; (9)
lim
t!1
exp
  i (t)i (t)i (t) = 0; (10)
As seen by solving di¤erential equation (8) under transversality condition
(10), the optimal i(t) equals the lifetime utility obtained from the optimal
consumption stream after time t. We assume that the current value marginal
utility of ci is positive: ic
 
ci; i

(= uic   iic) > 0.1
Following Epstein (1987a) and Obstfeld (1990), we dene the rate of time
preference i as i =  d ln  i (t) =dtj _ci=0 ; where  i  ic
 
ci; i

exp ( i)
represents the present-value marginal utility of ci. The time preference rate
is computed as
i
 
ci; i

= i
 
ci
  i  ci; i
ic
 
ci; i
ic  ci : (11)
1In the following analyses, we assume away a possibility of satiation (ic 5 0) which
may occur under decreasing marginal impatience (ic < 0). See Hirose and Ikeda (2008)
for the implications of the satiated utility of decreasing marginal impatience consumers.
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It is valid that i = 
iic=
i
c around the steady state point in which 
i = 0
(see (8)). This implies that the degree of impatience, measured by i, is
marginally increasing or decreasing in the utility index i as ic is positive
or negative. We refer to consumer preferences as increasing marginal impa-
tience (IMI) when ic and hence 
i
 are positive, and as decreasing marginal
impatience (DMI) when ic and hence 
i
 are negative. From (6) and (7), the
optimal consumption dynamics can be written in terms of time preference as
_ci = i
 
ci; i
  
r   i  ci; i ; (12)
where i =  ic=icc(> 0).
2.2 Firms
The per capita production functions for the representative rms in country
i (i = 1; 2) are given by
yi = if i(ki) (13)
satisfying f ik > 0, f
i
kk < 0, where y
i denote output, and i represent para-
meters of productivity. We assume that there is no capital depreciation and
no adjustment cost of investment. As the results of prot maximization by
rms, we obtain
if ik (k
i) = r and if i(ki)  if ik (ki)ki = wi: (14)
In our setup, instantaneous international capital movement may occur,
so that we should regard the world total capital stock K  k1 + k2 as a
state variable. Noting that K = (1f 1k )
 1(r)+ (2f 2k )
 1(r), where (if ik )
 1
represents the inverse function of if ik , the interest rate r can be expressed
as a function of K:
r = (K); where K(K) =
(1f 1kk)(
2f 2kk)
1f 1kk + 
2f 2kk
< 0: (15)
2.3 The market equilibrium
The market-clearing conditions are given by
c1 + c2 + _K = y1 + y2 and a1 + a2 = K: (16)
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Then, from (1), (2), (13), (14), and (16), overtime changes in net foreign
assets, or the current accounts, _bi are expressed as
_bi = rbi + yi   ci   _ki: (17)
From (2), (8), (12), (14), (15), and (16), we can derive the reduced dy-
namic system as follows:
_c1 = 1
 
c1; 1
  
(K)  1  c1; 1 ; (18)
_c2 = 2
 
c2; 2
  
(K)  i  ci; i ; (19)
_
1
= 1
 
c1

1   u1  c1 ; (20)
_
2
= 2
 
c2

2   u2  c2 ; (21)
_K = 1f 1((1f 1k )
 1((K))) + 2f 2((2f 2k )
 1((K)))  c1   c2; (22)
_a1 = 1f 1((1f 1k )
 1((K))) + (K)(a1   (1f 1k ) 1((K)))  c1: (23)
This dynamic system has two pre-determined state variables, K and a1.
2.4 The steady-state equilibrium
From (1), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), and (18) through (23), the steady-state
equilibrium is characterized by the following equations:
1
 
c1

= 2
 
c2

= r(= (K)); (24)
1f 1k (k
1) = 2f 2k (k
2) = r(= (K)); (25)
yi = if i(ki) (i = 1; 2) ; (26)
c1 + c2 = y1 + y2; (27)
i = ui
 
ci

=r (i = 1; 2) ; (28)
bi = (ci   yi)=r (i = 1; 2) ; (29)
ai = ki + bi (i = 1; 2) ; (30)
where an asterisk denotes the steady-state value. The values of c1; c2; k1; k2; y1; y2
and r (or K) are jointly determined from (24) through (27). Then, i
(i = 1; 2) are determined from (28), bi from (29), and ai from (30).
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By linearizing the dynamic system composed of (18) to (23) around the
steady state, we obtain0BBBBBBB@
_c1
_c2
_
1
_
2
_K
_a1
1CCCCCCCA
=M
0BBBBBB@
c1   c1
c2   c2
1   1
1   2
K  K
a1   a1
1CCCCCCA ; (31)
with
M =
0BBBBBB@
0 0  r1c1=1c 0 K1 0
0 0 0  r2c2=2c K2 0
 1c 0 r 0 0 0
0  2c 0 r 0 0
 1  1 0 0 r 0
 1 0 0 0 Kb1 r
1CCCCCCA ;
where the coe¢ cient matrix is evaluated at the steady state.
Since this dynamic system has two pre-determined state variables, the
steady-state equilibrium is locally saddle-point stable if and only if M has
two negative eigenvalues. As proved in Appendix A, we thus obtain the
following property.2
Property 1: The steady-state equilibrium is locally saddle-point stable if
and only if 
(r1c   K) > 0; (r2c   K) > 0; and
	  (r1c   K)(r2c   K)  (K)2 > 0: (32)
Otherwise, the steady-state equilibrium is locally unstable.
Figure 1 displays the region of (1c ; 
2
c) in which the saddle-point stability
conditions (32) are satised. It makes clear the following property.
Property 2: For the steady-state equilibrium to be saddle-point stable, at
least one of the two countries needs to display IMI. If both counties exhibit
DMI, the steady-state equilibrium is necessarily unstable.
2These stability conditions are consistent with the Appendix of Epstein (1987a).
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Insert Figure 1.
The same property as Property 2 holds valid in the case of an endowment
two-country world economy (e.g., Jafarey and Park, 1998; Hirose and Ikeda,
2012a,b), in which the saddle-point stability condition is given by
1c + 
2
c > 0: (33)
Note, however, that, as seen from Figure 1, the saddle-point stability con-
dition in the endowment economy (33) is necessary, but not su¢ cient, for
(32).3 This implies the following property.
Property 3: The saddle-point stability condition is more restrictive in our
capital-accumulation economy than in the endowment economy.
In addition, the saddle-point stable region with either country having
DMI in Figure 1 shrinks as the absolute value of K becomes smaller. Noting
r = (K), the following property is obtained.
Property 4: As r is less elastic to a change in K, the saddle-point stability
condition (32) is more restrictive.4
To be intuitive, the dynamic system is more easily adjustable in the en-
dowment economy, in which the interest rate can be instantly adjustable
upon shocks, than in the capital-accumulation economy, in which the inter-
est rate can change only sluggishly due to overtime changes in the aggregate
capital stock.5 That is why, as Property 3 shows, the stability condition
is more restrictive in our capital-accumation economy. As seen from this
discussion, the dynamic adjustablity in our capital-accumulation economy
becomes lower as the interest rate is less elastic to a change in the capital
stock, as Property 4 states.
3In Figure 1, 	 = 0 is tangent to 1c + 
2
c = 0 at (
1
c ; 
2
c) = (0; 0).
4Conversly, (32) approches to (33) as jK j ! 1 .
5This intuition will be detailed in the analysis of Section 3.2.
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3 The implications of DMI with capital ac-
cumulation
For investigating the implications of DMI in our two-country model with cap-
ital accumulation, hereafter, we assume the following saddle-point stability
in which one country displays a DMI preference.
Assumption 1: Country 1 exhibits DMI (1c < 0) while country 2 exhibits
IMI (2c > 0).
Assumption 2: The saddle-point stability conditions (32) hold valid.
Figure 2 illustrates the determination of the steady-state interest rate r
under these assumptions. By letting C  c1 + c2 and Y   y1 + y2,
the "steady-state demand curve" represents the locus of (C; r) satisfying
(24), while the "steady-state supply curve" represents the locus of (Y ; r)
satisfying (25) and (26). Since C = Y  (i.e., (27)) in equilibrium, r is
determined at the intersection E of these two schedules.
Insert Figure 2.
The steady-state supply curve is negatively sloping, because a lower in-
terest rate leads to capital accumulation and hence more output is supplied.
As derived in Appendix B (see Figure A1), the slope of the steady-state de-
mand curve is also negative under Assumptions 1 and 2. If the steady-state
interest rate r rises, the steady-state consumption demand in DMI country
1 c1(= (1c)
 1(r)) decreases while the steady-state consumption demand in
DMI country 2 c2(= (2c)
 1(r)) increases. Under Assumption 2, we have1c < 2c and hence (1c) 1 > (2c) 1, implying that c1 is more elastic
than c2 in response to a change in r. Accordingly, a rise in r decreases the
steady-state world total consumption demand C.
Besides, the slope of the steady-state supply curve is steeper than that
of the steady-state demand curve. The slopes of the steady-state demand
and supply curves are given by
dr
dC
=
1c
2
c
1c + 
2
c
and
dr
dY 
=
K
r
, respectively.
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, 	 > 0 in (32) implies that (0 >)
1c
2
c
1c + 
2
c
>
K
r
.
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3.1 Shifts in time preference
At rst, we consider the e¤ects of upward shifts of subjective discount rate
schedules. See Figure 3. When a upward shift in the subjective discount rate
schedule takes place in DMI country 1, its result is quite natural. As shown
in Appendix B (see Figure A2 (i)), a upward shift in the 1-schedule shifts
the steady-state demand curve upward. In Figure 3, this upward shift in
the steady-state demand curve brings the intersection with the steady-state
supply curve from E to E 0, implying that the steady-state interest rate r
rises and the capital stock are decumulated. This result is the same as in the
case where both two countries have the IMI preferences (e.g., Devereux and
Shi, 1991).
Insert Figure 3.
When a upward shift in the subjective discount rate schedule occurs in
IMI country 2, it leads to a paradoxical result. As shown in Appendix B (see
Figure A2 (ii)), an upward shift in the 2-schedule shifts the steady-state
demand curve downward. In Figure 3, this downward shift in the steady-state
demand curve brings the intersection with the steady-state supply curve from
E to E 00. Although the subjective discount rate schedule shifts upward, the
steady-state interest rate r lowers and capital accumulation is stimulated.
Proposition 1: Suppose that country 1 has DMI whereas country 2 has IMI
(Assumption 1), and that the saddle-point stability conditions are met (As-
sumption 2). Then, an upward shift of the subjective discount rate schedule in
IMI country 2 paradoxically lowers the steady-state interest rate, and hence
increases the steady-state capital stock and output in both counties.
3.2 International transfers
Given the initial values of the state variables K(0) and a1(0), the linearized
solution of the saddle-path dynamics is analytically calculated in Appendix
C.
Let us analyze the e¤ects of international transfers. Suppose that the
world economy is initially at the steady-state equilibrium and some wealth
10
is transferred from one country to the other at time 0. By using a numerical
example given in Table 1, Figures 4 (a) and 4 (b) illustrate the saddle-path
dynamics in response to international transfers, where (a) represents a case
of a transfer from IMI country 2 to DMI country 1, and (b) represents a case
of a transfer from IMI country 1 to DMI country 2.
Insert Figures 4 (a) & 4 (b).
Insert Table 1.
The recipient countrys lifetime utility naturally improves while the donor
countrys lifetime utility becomes worse.6 In our model, however, interna-
tional transfers have no long-run e¤ects, because the steady-state equilibrium
does not depend on the initial asset stocks (see (24) to (30)).
In our model with two state variables, there exists a possibility of non-
monotonic saddle-path dynamics. In fact, the saddle-path dynamics after
international transfers show the following non-monotonic characteristics, as
seen in Figures 4 (a) and 4 (b).
Proposition 2: In our capital-accumulation economy under Assumptions 1
and 2, the saddle-path dynamics after international transfers have the fol-
lowing characteristics.
(i) The interest rate and the capital stock initially and sluggishly deviate
from their constant steady-state values and then return to them again.
(ii) A transfer from IMI country to DMI country causes the interest rate
deviate downwards, while a transfer from DMI country to IMI country causes
the interest rate deviate upwards.
(iii) The time path of DMI countrys consumption is non-monotonic,
whereas that of IMI countrys is monotonic.
For understanding these non-monotonic dynamics in our capital-accumulation
economy, it would be helpful to compare them with monotonic dynamics in
6In these examples, we assume that initial net foreign assets are zero. With non-zero
initial net foreign assets, the transfer might harm the recipient country and benet the
donor country by changing the interest rate. This dynamic version of the transfer paradix
was pointed out by Epstein (1987a).
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a endowment economy. Figures 5 (a) and 5 (b) depicts the e¤ects of inter-
national transfers in the case of the endowment economy.7
Insert Figures 5 (a) & 5 (b).
In Figure 5 (a), a transfer from IMI country 2 to DMI country 1 initially
makes both countries patient. In Figure 5 (b), in contrast, a transfer from
DMI country 1 to IMI country 2 initially makes both countries impatient.
The saddle-point stability condition in the endowment economy (i.e., (33)),
which is met under Assumption 2, requires that the donor country (i.e.,
country 2 in (a); country 1 in (b)) become more patient than the recipient
country (i.e., country 1 in (a); country 2 in (b)). In the endowment economy,
the interest rate r is determined as a weighted sum of the two countries
rates of time preference 1 and 2.8 The donor country, whose rate of time
preference is lower than r, accumulates wealth, whereas the recipient country,
whose rate of time preference is higher than r, decumulates wealth. As a
result, the world economy monotonically converges to the steady state.
In the capital-accumulation economy, the impact e¤ects of the interna-
tional transfers on 1 and 2 are similar as those in the endowment economy,
but the interest rate cannot change instantaneously. Accordingly, r(0) >
1(0) > 2(0) is valid in Figure 4 (a), and r(0) < 1(0) < 2(0) in Figure 4
(b). For stability, r must be adjusted nally into the region between 1 and
2, that is, the inequalities between r and 1 need to be reversed by overtime
changes in K, as illustrated in Figures 4 (a) and 4 (b). If the interest rate is
so inelastic that the inequalities between r and 1 keep eternally unchanged,
the economy cannot converge to the steady state.9
From (12), DMI countrys consumption c1 also shows non-monotonic ad-
justment, because the inequality relationships between r and 1 is reversed
midway on the saddle path. On the other hand, IMI countrys consumption
c2 monotonically converges to the steady-state level, since the inequality re-
lationship between r and 2 never changes. If both countries exhibit IMI
7The endowment is given by the steady-state output level in Table 1 (i.e., y1 = y2 = 20).
8In the endowment economy, r(t) =
1
1 + 2
1(t)+
1
1 + 2
2(t) (see e.g., eq.(12) in
Hirose and Ikeda, 2012a).
9This argument details the intuitive reason for Properties 3 and 4 mentioned in the
end of Section 2.4.
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(as in Devereux and Shi, 1991), non-monotonic consumption adjustment is
not brought about by such international transfers.10 We thus nd that non-
monotonic consumption adjustment after international transfers is specic
only to a DMI country in the capital-accumulation economy.
3.3 Improvements in productivity
Next, we investigate the e¤ects of improvements in productivity i (i = 1; 2).
The mathematical results of the steady-state e¤ects, derived from (24) to
(30), are given by Table 2.
Insert Table 2.
3.3.1 An improvement in DMI countrys productivity
Column (I) of Table 3 displays the qualitative results of the steady-state
e¤ects of an improvement in DMI country 1s productivity 1.
Insert Table 3.
An improvement in 1 lowers the steady-state interest rate r. As illus-
trated in Figure 6, it shifts the steady-state supply curve rightward and brings
the intersection with the steady-state demand curve from E to ~E, implying
that r falls. Therefore, not only in country 1 experiencing an improvement in
productivity but also in neighboring country 2, the steady-state capital stock
and output increase. In DMI country 1, the steady-state consumption and
lifetime utility increase. Because the increase in the steady-state consump-
tion is larger than that in the steady-state output, country 1s steady-state
10In Devereux and Shi (1991), international transfers do not a¤ect the interest rate and
the capital stock even in the short run. This result is, however, due to a special assumption
for their lifetime utility function. When both country have IMI, generally speaking, the
e¤ects of international transfers on the interest rate and the capital stock are ambiguous.
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net foreign assets typically increase.11 In neighboring IMI country 2, the
steady-state consumption and lifetime utility decrease.
Insert Figure 6.
Concerning the impact e¤ects of an improvement in productivity, we can
nd analytically the following two facts. First, the impact e¤ects on the
interest rate is positive, though its steady-state e¤ect is negative. Noting
that K = k1 + k2 cannot change instantaneously, from (14) (or (15)), the
interest rate must rise immediately after a production shock, accompanied by
instantaneous capital movement to the country experiencing an improvement
in productivity from the neighboring country.
Second, the impact e¤ect on the welfare of the country with a productivity
improvement is denitely positive and the impact e¤ect on the welfare of the
neighboring country is approximately zero, when b1(0) = b2(0) = 0. From
Table 2 and Appendix C, we can obtain that
di(0)
di

bi(0)=0
=
icf
i
r
(> 0) (i = 1; 2); (34)
dj(0)
di

bi(0)=0
= 0 (j 6= i): (35)
3.3.2 An improvement in IMI countrys productivity
Column (II) of Table 3 summarizes the qualitative results of the steady-state
e¤ects of an improvement in IMI country 2s productivity 2.
An improvement in 2 lowers the steady-state interest rate r, similarly as
in the previous case of an improvement in 1 (see again Figure 6), so that the
steady-state capital stock and output increase in both countries. However,
the steady-state e¤ects on consumption and lifetime utility contrast to those
in the previous case. In the country with a productivity improvement, since it
is IMI country 2, the steady-state consumption and lifetime utility decrease,
and therefore the steady-state net foreign assets also typically decrease. In
11If country 1 has huge net foreign debt initially, it may be able to increase steady-state
net foreign debt, because the interest payment decreases due to a fall in r.
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the neighboring DMI country 1, the steady-state consumption and lifetime
utility increase.
In this case as well as in the the previous case of an improvement in
1, the impact e¤ects on the interest rate is positive in spite of the negative
steady-state e¤ect on it; the impact e¤ect on the welfare of the country with a
productivity improvement is positive; and the spill-over e¤ect on the welfare
of the neighboring country (1(0)) is negligible, when b1(0) = b2(0) = 0 (see
(34) and (35)).
The e¤ects of improvements in productivity can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 3: In our setting under Assumptions 1 and 2, suppose that
productivity in one country improves. Then, we can obtain the following
results:
(i) The interest rate falls in the long run, although it rises in the short
run after the production shock.
(ii) In both countries, the capital stock is accumulated and the steady-state
output increases.
(iii) Whichever country experiences an improvement in productivity, the
steady-state consumption increases in the DMI country whereas it decreases
in the IMI country.
Moreover, supposing that the initial net foreign assets are zero, we can
also say the followings:
(iv) An improvement in productivity of one country improves the countrys
welfare and has no spill-over e¤ect on the neighboring countrys welfare.
(v) An improvement in the DMI countrys productivity increases its steady-
state net foreign assets, while an improvement in the IMI countrys produc-
tivity decreases its steady-state net foreign assets.
3.3.3 Comparison with the case of two IMI countries
Finally, let us compare our results summarized as Proposition 3 with the one
in Devereux and Shi (1991) (hereafter D-S) where both two countries have
IMI preference. In Table 3, Column (III) summarizes the results in the D-S
case. Four points are especially deserving of notice.
First, the e¤ects on the steady-state interest rate are opposite to those
in the D-S setting. An improvement in productivity raises r in the D-S
setting whereas it reduces r in our setting, irrespective of in which country
the productivity improvement occurs (Proposition 3 (i)).
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Second, improvements in productivity commonly increase the world total
output. In the D-S setting, however, the output increases only in the coun-
try experiencing an improvement in productivity, while the output in the
neighboring country decreases due to capital decumulation. In our setting,
by contrast, the steady-state output increases in both countries (Proposition
3 (ii)).
Third, increases in the steady-state world total consumption are brought
by improvements in productivity. In the D-S setting, the steady-state con-
sumption increases in both countries, implying that benets of improvements
in productivity are shared by both countries in the long run. In our setting,
whichever country experiences a productivity improvement, the steady-state
consumption increases only in the DMI country. It decreases in the IMI
country (Proposition 3 (iii)).
Fourth, the e¤ect on the steady-state net foreign assets in our setting
depends on whether an improvement in productivity happens in the DMI
country or in the IMI country (Proposition 3 (v)). This result is quite di¤er-
ent from the one in the D-S setting, where the steady-state net foreign assets
of the country experiencing an improvement in productivity always decrease.
Consequently, the prediction in D-S that countries with higher (lower)
productivity should be long-run debtors (creditors) is not necessarily valid
in our setting. In the D-S setting, benets of higher productivity are shared
between both countries in the long run, so that countries with higher pro-
ductivity can diminish net foreign assets.
In our setting, the e¤ect on the interest rate a¤ects signicantly the inter-
national distribution of steady-state consumption, that is, under the lower
steady-state interest rate associated with higher productivity, steady-state
consumption tends to be biased toward the DMI country. Owing to this
e¤ect, contrary to the D-S case, a country with higher productivity is more
likely to be a long-run creditor if it has DMI.
4 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the implications of DMI in a two-country world
economy with capital accumulation. Supposing that one country has a DMI
preference, for the steady-state equilibrium to be saddle-point stable, it is
necessary that the other country displays IMI. Although the same property is
valid in the case of an endowment economy, saddle-point stability condition is
16
more restrictive in our capital-accumulation economy than in the endowment
economy.
For investigating the implications of DMI, we thus consider the case in
which one country exhibits DMI while the other country exhibits IMI, with
retaining the saddle-point stability of the equilibrium dynamics. Then, an
upward shift of the subjective discount rate schedule in IMI country lowers
the steady-state interest rate, and hence increases the steady-state capital
stock and output in both counties. This paradoxical result cannot be ob-
tained in the case where both counties display IMI as in Devereux and Shi
(1991).
Considering the saddle-path dynamics after international transfers in our
capital-accumulation economy, the interest rate and the capital stock ini-
tially and sluggishly deviate from their constant steady-state values and then
return to them again. Besides, although the convergence path of IMI coun-
trys consumption is monotonic, that of DMI countrys consumption is non-
monotonic. Such non-monotonic consumption adjustment after international
transfers never emerges if both counties have IMI preference.
As the e¤ects of improvements in productivity, we obtain the following
results. First, the interest rate falls in the long run, although it rises in
the short run. Second, the steady-state capital stock and output increase in
both countries. Third, the steady-state consumption increases in the DMI
country while it decreases in the IMI country. Fourth, an improvement in
the DMI countrys productivity typically increases its steady-state net foreign
assets, whereas an improvement in the IMI countrys productivity typically
decreases its steady-state net foreign assets. These results also quite di¤er
from those in the case of Devereux and Shi (1991).
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Appendix A: The proof of Proposition 1
The characteristic equation of M is given by
det(M   xI6) = (x  r)2
(x) = 0;
where

(x) = fx2(x  r)2   !x(x  r) +  g
= x4   2rx3 + (r2   !)x2 + r!x+  );
! = (r1c   K)1 + (r2c   K)2;
 = (r21c
2
c   r1cK   r2cK)12:
By letting ~x = x  1
2
r, 
(x) = 0 is rewritten as
~x4   1
2
(r2 + 2!)~x2 +
1
16
r4 +
1
4
r2! +  = 0:
Therefore,
~x2 =
1
4
n
r2 + 2! 
p
(2!)2   16 
o
;
~x = 1
2
q
r2 + 2! 
p
(2!)2   16 ;
and hence,
x =
1
2

r 
q
r2 + 2! 
p
(2!)2   16 

:
Note that (2!)2 16 = 4f(r1c  K)1  (r2c  K)2g2+4(K)212 > 0.
Let us denote
x1 =
1
2

r  
q
r2 + 2! +
p
(2!)2   16 

;
x2 =
1
2

r  
q
r2 + 2!  
p
(2!)2   16 

;
x3 =
1
2

r +
q
r2 + 2!  
p
(2!)2   16 

;
x4 =
1
2

r +
q
r2 + 2! +
p
(2!)2   16 

:
The signs of x1, x2, x3, and x4 depend on the signs of ! and  as Table A1.
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Insert Table A1.
Therefore, the characteristic equation of M has two negative roots, im-
plying that the steady-state equilibrium is locally saddle-point stable, if and
only if ! > 0 and  > 0, or equivalently,
(r1c   K) > 0; (r2c   K) > 0; and
	  (r1c   K)(r2c   K)  (K)2 > 0: (32)
Otherwise, the characteristic equation of M has one or no negative root, so
that the steady-state equilibrium is unstable.
AppendixB: The derivation of the steady-state
demand curve
Figure A1 derives the negative slope of the steady-state demand curve
under Assumptions 1 and 2. When the steady-state world total consumption
demand is given by CM , for example, r

M which satises 
1 (c1) = 2 (c2) =
rM and c
1 + c2 = CM is given by the height of the intersection XM of
1 (c1)-schedule and 2 (CM   c1)-schedule. The point (CM ; rM) thus needs
to be on the steady-state demand curve. Similarly as (CM ; r

M), we can
obtain (CL; r

L), (C

H ; r

H) and so on. The steady-state demand curve is the
locus of these points. Because country 1 has DMI (1c < 0) and country
2 has IMI (2c > 0), the 
1 (c1)-schedule and the 2 (C   c1)-schedule are
both negative sloping. From Corollary 1,
1c < 2c, that is, the slope of the
2 (C   c1)-schedule is steeper than that of the 1 (c1)-schedule. Then, we
nd that rL > r

M > r

H for C

L < C

M < C

H , implying that the steady-state
demand curve is negatively sloping.
Insert Figure A1.
By using this derivation of the steady-state demand curve, Figure A2 (i)
shows that it shifts upward when an upward shift in the 1-schedule occurs,
whereas Figure A2 (ii) shows that it shifts downward when an upward shift
in the 2-schedule takes place.
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Insert Figures A2 (i) & (ii).
AppendixC:The linearized solution of the saddle-
path dynamics
Eigenvectors of M corresponding x1 and x2 (x1 < x2 < 0) are0BBBBBB@
(r   x1)v11
(r   x1)v21
1cv
1
1
2cv
2
1
1
~v11
1CCCCCCA and
0BBBBBB@
(r   x2)v12
(r   x2)v22
1cv
1
2
2cv
2
2
1
~v12
1CCCCCCA ;
respectively, where
v11 =
K
1
x1(r   x1) + r1c1
; v21 =
K
2
x1(r   x1) + r2c2
(= 1  v11);
v12 =
K
1
x2(r   x2) + r1c1
; v22 =
K
2
x2(r   x2) + r2c2
(= 1  v12);
~v11 = v
1
1  
Kb
1
r   x1 ; ~v
1
2 = v
1
2  
Kb
1
r   x2 ;
and xj(r   xj) + r2c2 6= 0 (j = 1; 2) are assumed.
The solution of (31) is thus
c1(t) = c1 + Z1(r   x1)v11 exp(x1t) + Z2(r   x2)v12 exp(x2t); (A.1)
c2(t) = c2 + Z1(r   x1)v21 exp(x1t) + Z2(r   x2)v22 exp(x2t); (A.2)
1(t) = 1 + Z1
1
cv
1
1 exp(x1t) + Z2
1
cv
1
2 exp(x2t); (A.3)
2(t) = 2 + Z1
2
cv
2
1 exp(x1t) + Z2
2
cv
2
2 exp(x2t); (A.4)
K(t) = K + Z1 exp(x1t) + Z2 exp(x2t); (A.5)
a1(t) = a1 + Z1~v11 exp(x1t) + Z2~v
1
2 exp(x2t); (A.6)
where
Z1 =
1
~v12   ~v11
 ~v12(K  K(0)) + (a1   a1(0))	 ;
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Z2 =
1
~v12   ~v11

~v11(K
  K(0))  (a1   a1(0))	 :
Noting that r  r = 1f 1kk(k1  k1) = 2f 2kk(k2(t)  k2) = K(K  K)
by linearizing (14) and (15), we obtain that
r(t) = r + KfZ1 exp(x1t) + Z2 exp(x2t)g; (A.7)
k1(t) = k1 +
K
1f 1kk
fZ1 exp(x1t) + Z2 exp(x2t)g; (A.8)
k2(t) = k2 +
K
2f 2kk
fZ1 exp(x1t) + Z2 exp(x2t)g; (A.9)
and hence, from (1),
b1(t) = b1+Z1

~v11  
K
1f 1kk

exp(x1t)+Z2

~v12  
K
1f 1kk

exp(x2t): (A.10)
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Table 1: A numerical example under Assumptions 1 and 2
function country 1 country 2
subjective
discount
rate
DMI : 1c =  0:0005
1(c1) ;  0:0005c1 + 0:06
around c1 = 20
 IMI : 2c = 0:001
2(c2) ; 0:001c2 + 0:03
around c2 = 20

utility
function
ui(ci) =  (ci   50)2; ci 2 [0; 50)
(i = 1; 2)
production
function
if i(ki) = 2
p
10(ki)0:25
(i = 1; 2)
steady-state value country 1 country 2
interest rate r = 0:05
capital stock k1 = 100 k2 = 100
output y1 = 20 y2 = 20
consumption c1 = 20 c2 = 20
lifetime utility 1 =  18000 2 =  18000
net foreign assets b1 = 0 b2 = 0
Note: K =  1:875 10 4; 	 = 3:4375 10 9
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Table 2: The mathematical results of the steady-state e¤ects of improvements in productivity
country i : the country experiencing an improvement in productivity
country j : the neighboring country

dr
di
=  r
1
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cK
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Table 3: The qualitative results of the steady-state e¤ects of improvements in productivity
country i : the country experiencing an improvement in productivity
country j : the neighboring country

(I) (II) (III)
the e¤ects of
an improvement
in i
country i : DMI
country j : IMI
(i = 1; j = 2)
country i : IMI
country j : DMI
(i = 2; j = 1)
country i : IMI
country j : IMI
(D-S, 1991)
r     +
K + + ?
ki + + ?
yi + + +
country i ci; i +   +
bi +    
ai +   ?
kj + +  
yj + +  
country j cj; j   + +
bj   + +
aj   + +
Note: The e¤ects on bi, bj, ai, and aj are obtained when b1(0) = b2(0) = 0.
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Table A1: The signs of xi (i = 1; 2; 3; 4)
 > 0  = 0  < 0
! > 0
x1 < 0; x2 < 0;
x3 > 0; x4 > 0
x1 < 0; x2 = 0;
x3 > 0; x4 > 0
x1 < 0; x2 > 0;
x3 > 0; x4 > 0
! = 0

inconsistent with
(2!)2   16 > 0
 
inconsistent with
(2!)2   16 > 0

x1 < 0; x2 > 0;
x3 > 0; x4 > 0
! < 0
x1 > 0; x2 > 0;
x3 > 0; x4 > 0
x1 = 0; x2 > 0;
x3 > 0; x4 > 0
x1 < 0; x2 > 0;
x3 > 0; x4 > 0
Note: xi > 0 (i = 1; 2; 3; 4) include the cases of imaginary roots with
positive real parts.
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Figure 1. The saddle-point stability conditions 
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Figure 2. The steady-state supply curve and the steady-state demand curve 
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Figure 3. The effects of shifts in subjective discount rate schedules 
 (i) upward shift in 1δ -schedule 
 (ii) upward shift in 2δ -schedule 
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Figure 4. (a) The saddle-path dynamics in the capital-accumulation economy: 
 the case of transfer from IMI country 2 to DMI country 1 
 
  
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. (b) The saddle-path dynamics in the capital-accumulation economy: 
 the case of transfer from DMI country 1 to IMI country 2 
 
  
 
   
 
   
 
 
Figure 5. (a) The saddle-path dynamics in the endowment economy: 
   the case of transfer from IMI country 2 to DMI country 1 
 
  
 
   
 
   
 
 
Figure 5. (b) The saddle-path dynamics in the endowment economy: 
  the case of transfer from DMI country 1 to IMI country 2 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. The effects of improvements in productivity 
(I) increase in 1α  
(II) increase in 2α  
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Figure A1. The derivation of the steady-state demand curve 
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 Figure A2. (i) An upward shift of the steady-state demand curve 
by an upward shift in 1δ -schedule 
 
 
Figure A2. (ii) A downward shift of the steady-state demand curve 
by an upward shift in 2δ -schedule 
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